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ABSTRACT-According to a recent plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court,
the danger that federal taxes will "crowd-out" state revenues justifies
aggressive judicial limits on the conditions attached to federal spending.
Economic theory offers a number of reasons to believe the opposite: federal
revenue increases may also buoy state finances. To test these competing
claims, I examine for the first time the relationship between total federal
revenues and state revenues. I find that, contra the NFIB v. Sebelius
plurality, increases in federal revenue-controlling, of course, for
economic performance and other factors-are associated with a large and
statistically significant increase in state revenues. This version of the study
provides extensive background explanations of underlying economic
concepts for readers unfamiliar with the prior public finance literature.
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[H]eavy federal taxation diminishes the practical ability of States to
collect their own taxes.t
INTRODUCTION
NFIB v. Sebelius-the health care case-upheld most of the
Affordable Care Act, but allowed states to "opt out" of certain aspects of
the law's changes to the Medicaid program.' As early commentators have
noted, the Medicaid portions of the decision rewrote seventy-seven years of
precedent, altered one of the fundamental legal rules underlying the modem
state, and, oh by the way, may also affect access to health care for
millions.2 What other writers have not yet observed is that all of those
outcomes depend logically on a single factual claim, made explicitly by
four "dissenters" and relied upon implicitly by the three Justices who
joined the "majority" opinion. The Court's entire analysis of that fact is set
out in the quotation just above this paragraph. My goal here is to give a
more serious examination, including both theoretical and original empirical
analysis, of whether federal taxation affects states' "practical ability ... to
collect their own taxes."'
First, a little more background. Medicaid is an exercise of the federal
power of conditional spending.4 Congress can "lay and collect Taxes ...
to ... provide for the . . . general Welfare," and can impose conditions on
t Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 n.13 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
I Id at 2608 (Roberts, J.).
2 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB,
101 GEO. L.J. 861, 864 (2013); Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid
and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2, 5-7
(2013).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662, n. 13 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
4 Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 433 (2004).
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the receipt of those funds.' Between 1935 and late June of 2012, that power
faced few meaningful restrictions.' Starting in the 1990s, though, the Court
held that Congress was prohibited from "commandeering" state officials.'
Effectively, the federal government could regulate state officials qua state
officials only if states were willing to accept money in exchange. In NFIB,
however, Justice Roberts's opinion declared that federal threats to revoke
Medicaid funds in some settings could so "coerce" states that the states had
no "real" choice but to comply, rendering Medicaid the practical equivalent
of commandeering.! Two Justices joined in that portion of the decision,
while four other Justices, who described themselves as "dissenters,"
basically agreed with that outcome, although they did not formally join
Roberts's opinion.'
What does health care have to do with state taxes? Consider Justice
Roberts's claim that the threat of Medicaid revocation was a "gun to the
head" of states.o Colorful, but states do not have heads. What they do have
is budgets. A closer analogy might be the college student told by her
parents, "No more beer or no tuition." Many students would start to skip
the keg parties. But Mark Zuckerberg could laugh and drink up. Financial
pressure, in other words, depends on the need for and availability of other
sources of revenue." As the NFIB dissenters apparently recognized,
Medicaid's large contribution to state budgets does not itself make an
intuitive case for coercion; for states to really be pinched by budget threats,
it must also be the case that the lost funds could not readily be replaced.
The dissenters filled this logical gap by arguing that states cannot
afford to replace Medicaid. 2 Their claim, again, is that federal taxes make
it tougher for states to raise revenues. Although the dissenters offered no
further analysis, there have also been several academic proponents of this
"crowd-out" theory, most prominently the federalism scholar Lynn Baker."
5 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
6 Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 2-3.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161
(1992).
8 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (Roberts, J.).
9 Id at 2575, 2608; id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
to Id. at 2604 (Roberts, J.).
1 See Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L. REV.
1137, 1208 (1997).
12 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
13 Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1935-47
(1995) [hereinafter Baker, Conditional Spending]; see also RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH
THE STATE 150-57 (1993); Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. CT. REV. 71, 107; Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman,
Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever
Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 430-31 (1998) ("Assuming ...
that the states cannot generally afford to forego federal highway funds, [conditional spending] works
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While Baker's explanation is the most developed, even she offers little
examination of crowd-out beyond the intuition that voters who are already
taxed might not appreciate more taxes.14
The public finance economics literature, while not confronting the
crowd-out question directly, offers both theory and some evidence that
shed light on it. As economists recognize, though, the theoretical arguments
are ambiguous." For example, on the one hand federal taxes can make state
taxation more difficult by shrinking the tax "base" for each state; federal
taxes on boats probably mean that there will be fewer boat sales for states
to tax. But at the same time, by allowing state taxpayers to deduct state
taxes paid from federal income, the federal tax code effectively offers
states a matching grant to impose their own taxes, and this grant grows
more generous as the federal income tax rate rises.'" Thus, theory predicts
that federal taxes might actually lead to crowd-in, not crowd-out."
Prior empirical work has attempted to determine how the dueling
theories play out in reality, but the existing studies are too narrow to
resolve the crowd-out debate. One set of papers looks at whether changes
in the rates of one form of federal tax affect the rate of tax imposed on the
same base by lower levels of government-for instance, whether federal
gasoline excises increase or reduce state gas tax rates." But even if these
just as effectively to commandeer the state legislative process as did [commandeering]."); Thomas R.
McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85,
86; Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 958 (1985). Notably, the doctrinal
line that Justice Roberts ultimately adopts tracks closely Professor Baker's 1995 proposal, although
there were also other, earlier suggestions similar to Baker's. Compare NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06
(Roberts, J.) (appearing to test for coercion by looking at whether a federal grant withholds unrelated
funds), with Baker, Conditional Spending, supra, at 1973-74 (proposing same), and Richard B.
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1260-62 (1977) (concluding that same was the
likely implication of then-recent Supreme Court decisions).
14 Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 13, at 1936-38.
15 M.P. Devereux et al., Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some
Evidence from the USA, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 451, 458-60 (2007); Alejandro Esteller-Mor6 & Leonzio
Rizzo, (Uncontrolled) Aggregate Shocks or Vertical Tax Interdependence? Evidence from Gasoline and
Cigarettes, 64 NAT'L TAX J. 353, 354 (2011).
Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, Treasury I and the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The
Economics and Politics of Tax Reform, I ECON. PERSP. 37, 55 (1987); see I.R.C. § 164 (2012).
See Christian Kelders & Marko Koethenbuerger, Tax Incentives in Fiscal Federalism: An
Integrated Perspective, 43 CAN. J. ECON. 683, 684 (2010) ("Horizontal and vertical fiscal ties upwardly
distort local tax rate choices.").
1s Linda Andersson et al., Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities, II INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 243,
245, 255-56 (2004); Timothy J. Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, Vertical Externalities in Tax Setting:
Evidence from Gasoline and Cigarettes, 70 J. PUB. ECON. 383, 389-95 (1998); Marius Brllhart &
Mario Jametti, Vertical Versus Horizontal Tax Externalities: An Empirical Test, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 2027,
2048 (2006); Howard Chemick & Jennifer Tennant, Federal-State Tax Interactions in the United States
and Canada, 40 PUBLtUS: J. FEDERALISM 508, 519-27 (2010); Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 461-
79; Alejandro Esteller-Mor6 & Albert Sol6-Oll6, Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case ofPersonal
Income Taxation in Canada, 9 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 235, 236, 249 (2002) [hereinafter Esteller-Mor6
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papers agreed that federal taxes change state tax rates-they do not-they
still would not tell us whether states actually lose money, or whether they
are able to make up lost revenues elsewhere. Can states get back their lost
gas taxes through cigarette taxes? The studies do not tell us.
Another set of papers examines the impact of the federal deduction for
state and local taxes paid on state budgets.20 Those findings, too, are largely
inconsistent with one another.2' Even if they were in agreement, there are
other factors that can contribute to crowd-in or mitigate crowd-out.
I therefore present here the first examination of the total effect of
federal revenues on state revenue raising. Using a panel of state and federal
budget data from 1998 to 2010, I estimate the effects of federal revenues on
total state own-source revenues per capita22 and state own-source revenues
as a share of state GDP. In most specifications, I find considerable
evidence of crowd-in: federal revenues increase both state revenues and
state revenue as a fraction of available state wealth. Given the limitations of
these kinds of data, my findings do not prove that crowd-out is impossible
or that crowd-out did not exist in other periods. But they do suggest that
claims that federal spending coerces contemporary states may rest on a
mistaken factual premise.
My main purposes here are threefold. Most importantly, I want to
contribute the first piece of really useful evidence about an important fact
underlying a key constitutional controversy. I also want to introduce the
existing public finance economics theory on that controversy to the legal
community. Readers already familiar with fundamentals of economic
theory may therefore find my theoretical discussion longer than it needs to
be, but on the assumption that such readers can skim I err on the side of
explaining more rather than less.
& Sol6-Oll6, Canada]; Alex Esteller-Mord & Albert Sol6-O1li, Vertical Income Tax Externalities and
Fiscal Interdependence: Evidence from the US, 31 REGIONAL SC. & URB. EcoN. 247, 254-70 (2001)
[hereinafter Esteller-Mord & Sol6-Oll6, US]; Per G. Fredriksson & Khawaja A. Mamun, Vertical
Externalities in Cigarette Taxation: Do Tax Revenues Go Up in Smoke?, 64 J. URB. ECON. 35, 35-48
(2007).
19 For a survey, see Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 512-15.
20 Id. at 515-18; Paul N. Courant & Edward M. Gramlich, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 on State and Local Fiscal Behavior, in Do TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986, at 243, 244-63 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990); Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey Rosen, Federal
Deductibility and Local Property Tax Rates, 27 J. URB. ECON. 269, 270 (1990); Edward M. Gramlich,
The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 447, 453-58 (1985); Gilbert E. Metcalf,
Assessing the Federal Deduction for State and Local Tax Payments, 64 NAT'L TAX J. 565, 576-88
(2011); see also Bruce Bartlett, The Case for Eliminating Deductibility of State and Local Taxes,
28 TAX NOTES 1121, 1122-23 (1985) (surveying earlier studies).
21 Chemick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515; Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 487 &
n.206 (1996).
22 That is, revenues other than money received from the federal government.
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Finally, I believe that my empirical results are independently
interesting for the economic literature, whatever the implications for legal
rules. The relationship between national revenues and subnational revenue
capacity is also potentially critical for fiscal federalism theory. For
example, some have argued that in a federation, new government projects
create negative fiscal externalities for other tiers of government-in other
words, that taxes at one level tend to crowd out taxes for others-and that
this implies that federalism leads to governments that are excessively
bloated.23 But in the presence of crowding-in, where fiscal externalities are
positive, the implication is that federalism actually leads to governments
that are too small.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains in more
detail the legal reasoning that puts the crowd-out question at the center of
Spending Clause analysis. Part II explores the economic and political
theory of the relationship between federal and state revenues, focusing on
arguments that might lead us to expect crowd-out. Part III collects some
arguments that predict the opposite. Part IV summarizes the so-far-
inconclusive evidence. And Part V then describes my original empirical
evidence, including my findings that in recent years federal revenues have
tended to increase state proceeds.
I. BACKGROUND
Conditional federal spending is a centerpiece of the modern regulatory
architecture of the United States.24 With the exception of Medicare, nearly
every big-ticket item on the federal government's domestic spending
budget goes to support a joint venture with the states. Unemployment
insurance, aid to the poor, education standards and incentives, clean air and
water, health care for the indigent and those with disabilities, and legal
protections against state-sponsored discrimination: all are designed as a set
of conditions on federal grants to states.25
The legal underpinnings of these structures were stable for about
seventy-five years. In 1937, the Supreme Court turned back challenges to
the newly enacted Social Security and Unemployment Insurance systems.26
The plaintiffs had urged the Court to throw out unemployment insurance
because of its novel structure: it channeled reams of federal dollars to
states, in exchange for their agreement to tax their own employers and to
23 See Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High
Taxes?, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 363, 363 (2002); Russell S. Sobel, Optimal Taxation in a Federal System
of Governments, 64 S. ECON. J. 468,469-73 (1997).
24 For an overview, see Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 668-73 (2001).
25 See Brief for David Satcher et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8-11, Florida ex
rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400).
26 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 574-78, 598 (1937).
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administer claims by unemployed workers. 27 This structure, the plaintiff
employers argued, was "coerci[ve]," because it forced states into the
service of the national government.28 The Court, in a famous passage by
Justice Cardozo, refused to countenance that claim, arguing that the
concept of coercion was difficult to fathom when applied to states, and that
any effort to define coercion in that context would "plunge the law in
endless difficulties."29
Not much happened on the coercion front for the next sixty years. As a
formal matter, Cardozo's opinion had held out the possibility that some
future statute might be found coercive, but given the rationale for his
decision-that coercion as a concept was not judicially manageable-it
was hard to see how any such claim could succeed." And, indeed, from
1936 until 2012, no court found that a federal statute had coerced state
grant recipients.'
In the background, though, some important details were developing.
Twice in the 1990s, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government
could not "commandeer" nonjudicial state officials.32 That is, Congress
could not enact a law directing state officials to act-could not, for
instance, order state officials to conduct background checks before issuing
firearm permits.33 But the Court also was careful to distinguish
commandeering from conditional spending; Congress could still offer
money to the states subject to conditions.34 As long as states were legally
free to reject the terms of the offer, it was not commandeering."
The Court's reasons for its distinction between commands and
conditions were never clearly formulated. The only real explanation from
the bench was that commandeering obscured public accountability: voters
might wrongly blame state officials for following their federal orders." As
commentators observed, one could say much the same about conditional
spending and other forms of cooperative federalism." The most likely
27 Id. at 585-87.
28 Id at 578.
29 Id at 589-90.
30 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (suggesting theoretical possibility that
federal spending could coerce states, but finding no coercion on the facts then before the Court).
31 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 372
(2008); Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 2.
32 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
3 Printz, 521 U.S. at 902, 923; New York, 505 U.S. at 175 (holding that a law requiring states to
either take title to nuclear waste or regulate it in line with federal standards impermissibly
commandeered state governments).
34 New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67, 171-74.
3 Id at 174.
36 Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-30; New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69, 182-83.
Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL
VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
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distinction, some argued, was that when voters blamed their local officials
for the outcomes that flowed from a federal grant, those voters were not
wrong: whereas commandeered officials had no part in the outcome, state
officials "deserved" blame at least for agreeing to the grant."
Other commentators also suggested that the two scenarios could be
distinguished by an "internalization" principle." Under conditional
spending, the federal government at least had to pay a price for its policies,
while commandeering allowed Congress to pass the costs of enforcement
on to the states.4 0 By forcing Congress to pay, commandeering indirectly
limited federal power, because Congress would have to raise taxes to pay
for its policies.4'
Fast-forward to 2012. As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
Congress had enacted an expansion of the Medicaid program.42 To simplify
considerably, the ACA required that states receiving Medicaid money
expand the pool of persons eligible for Medicaid assistance, and provided
for enhanced subsidies to cover the cost of these "newly eligible
individuals." 43  A number of states then challenged the expansion as
unconstitutionally coercive."
UNION 213, 231 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"
Doesn 't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 826-28 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits
ofLaw: Printz and Principle?, Il 1 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2200-05 (1998).
38 Even this story breaks down if one considers that state officials can also be blamed for their
failure to lobby effectively in warding off "commandeering" enactments. Brian Galle, Getting
Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of
Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 201 & nn.273, 275 (2004); see Neil S. Seigel, Commandeering
and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1662-63 (2006) (noting that
voters would have been correct in assuming that state officials were involved in the decision to transfer
title of nuclear waste in New York).
D. Bruce LaPierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process-the Alternative to
Judicial Review ofFederalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 644-45 (1985); Seigel, supra note 38, at
1644-45.
40 See Seigel, supra note 38, at 1644-45.
41 See id; see also Galle, supra note 38, at 167-70 (arguing that conditional spending is
distinguishable from the other enumerated powers on this basis).
42 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001, 124 Stat. 119, 153
(2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(l0)(A)(i)(VlI)). Medicaid is a cooperative
enterprise in which states provide payment for medical care for low-income and disabled households,
supported by federal matching grants ranging from 50% to 83%, and subject to a long set of federal
rules and requirements. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 3, 5
(2013), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7334-04.pdf; KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID
& THE UNINSURED, A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF How STATES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE AVAILABILITY
OF FEDERAL FUNDS FOR HEALTH COVERAGE 2 (2012). States may escape the conditions by forfeiting
the money. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
43 Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 25-30.
4 See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256
(N.D. Fla.), affd in part, rev'd in part, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), affid in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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Most readers surely know what happened next. The Court, in a divided
decision, ruled that conditioning funds already provided under preexisting
Medicaid rules on states' acceptance of the Medicaid expansion indeed was
coercive.45 Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, then went
on to state that the Medicaid expansion could go forward, but that the only
permissible sanction for states that refused would be the loss of the "new"
Medicaid spending authorized in the ACA. 46 Two other Justices, Ginsburg
and Sotomayor, would have upheld the ACA in its entirety, yielding five
votes for upholding at least some portion of the Medicaid expansion.47 The
other four Justices agreed with Roberts that the Medicaid expansion was
coercive, but would have gone further and thrown out the entire statute.48
Other commentators have already begun ably to attempt to unpack the
tangle of arguments in Justice Roberts's opinion,49 So I want to focus here
on the key analogy between federal grants and commandeering. Roberts
argues that "[t]he Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority
to require the States to regulate"so and that that principle "is true whether
Congress directly commands a State to regulate or indirectly coerces a
State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own."" Given that federal
Medicaid matching grants provide an average of ten percent of states'
budgets, Roberts writes, states have "no real option but to acquiesce."52
Though I agree with Professor Bagenstos that Roberts's opinion also
appears to set out some additional requirements for a conditional grant to
be unconstitutional," this equivalence between grants and commandeering
looks to be at least necessary to, if not sufficient for, a finding of
unconstitutionality.
As I suggested at the outset, this equivalence is a puzzle. Let us set
aside, for the sake of argument, the large number of conceptual questions
one could raise about the claim that states, or perhaps state legislatures, can
be coerced.54 Let us pretend instead, as the NFIB opinions seem to, that
states are like humans, who can be menaced with guns, and for whom our
moral intuitions about concepts such as free will might have some
meaning. Even in that context, threats to impose money penalties are not
45 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (Roberts, J.).
4 Id. at 2607.
47 Id. at 2629-42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
48 Id. at 2656-68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
49 Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 866-71, 873-906; Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 37-76.
50 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (Roberts, J.) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178
(1992)).
51Id.
52 Id. at 2604-05.
5 Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 873-902.
54 See Bagenstos, supra note 31, at 372-80; Baker & Berman, supra note 13, at 521 (suggesting
that the concept of coercion has too many problems to be judicially manageable).
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typically seen as "coercion," because we recognize that humans do have
free will and are capable of deciding their own priorities." When Verizon
demands a $200 termination fee for my switch to AT&T, I will pay it if I
like AT&T's 4G coverage better. Put another way, states that refuse a grant
always have the legal authority to raise taxes or cut spending."6 What can
Roberts mean when he writes that the states have no "real" option?
One argument, if an implausible one, is politics. Maybe the claim is
simply that it is politically difficult to raise taxes." And, given the power of
entrenched interest groups, it may also sometimes be challenging to cut
spending," although most states in the recent recession had no such
difficulty." But what does "politically difficult" mean? Only that state
officials have something-reelection-that they value more than they value
refusing the grant. That again sounds like a choice. Perhaps there is a
constitutional argument that state officials should never have to make tough
political decisions, but if so it is not clear what the content of that argument
could be.60 Further, as I have suggested elsewhere, there are good reasons
to believe state officials often will have self-serving incentives to refuse
grants,' a point that is well illustrated by the fact that many Republican
governors are now threatening to refuse the Medicaid expansion.62
ss See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419-21
(1989). Having said that, even some noncoercive threats, such as blackmail, are sometimes off limits
legally. But the Court's argument here is not that Medicaid was a threat, but that it was a coercive
threat.
56 David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2544, 2561 (2005); see U.S.
CONST. art IV (guaranteeing states a republican form of government).
57 E.g., Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 15, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400).
5 This is also the core intuition behind the claim that states are "locked in" to federal grants: local
constituencies grow around grant programs, like coral, reducing state officials' political flexibility.
David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of
the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1243-44 (2004);
see Hills, supra note 37, at 903--04. My view is that state political influence over agencies that
implement cooperative programs generally mitigates any lock-in concerns. Galle, supra note 38, at
191-96.
See Monica Davey, Budget Worries Push Governors to Same Mind-Set, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2011, at Al; Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff& Erica Williams, An Update on State Budget Cuts: At Least
46 States Have Imposed Cuts that Hurt Vulnerable Residents and Cause Job Loss, CENTER ON BUDGET
& POL'Y PRIORITIES 1-2 (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-13-08sfp.pdf.
6 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 880 (arguing that political consequences for state officials who
turn down grants is part of the political accountability that the Court aims to protect).
61 Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REv. 875, 900-19 (2008).
62 Michael Cooper, Many Governors Are Still Unsure About Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2012, at A17; Robert Pear & Michael Cooper, Reluctance in Some States over Medicaid
Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012, at Al.
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Poverty is a better argument." Assume for the sake of discussion that
state governments provide absolutely vital services (however those are
defined) to their citizens, and are struggling on the brink of solvency."6 In
that situation, it at least becomes more tenable to claim that state officials
have no real option but to accept assistance; by assumption, without federal
dollars, states will lose something essential to their mission.6' That is the
scenario where it makes sense to suggest that conditional spending might
cause voters to assign blame to the wrong official, and in which it might be
possible for the federal government to foist off regulatory responsibility on
states without paying the full price.
The four dissenters in NFIB appear to have made this leap. Like
Roberts, they argue that coercive federal spending is equivalent to
commandeering.67 Their explanation for why the Medicaid expansion is
coercive is more detailed, though. They note that states "would be very
hard pressed to compensate for the loss of federal funds by cutting other
spending or raising additional revenue." 68 And, though they acknowledge
that states have sovereign control over taxing and spending,9 they argue
that the reason states would be unable to replace lost Medicaid dollars is
that "heavy federal taxation" has reduced the states' ability to raise money
for themselves." In effect, the claim is that federal taxes have crowded out
state taxes to such an extent that states have only a tenuous ability to raise
additional funds." While small federal grants might be replaceable, a grant
as large as Medicaid, in combination with the crowding effect of federal
taxation, makes refusal impractical.
63 Cf Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 13, at .1938 (comparing states receiving grants to
welfare recipients who would starve without assistance); Baker & Berman, supra note 13, at 519-20
(comparing states to a "destitute widow").
For evidence on whether U.S. states have found themselves in this position in recent times, see
Galle, supra note 61, at 923-30 (short answer: no).
65 would like to avoid getting too bogged down in philosophical debate over what "coercion"
means. But note here briefly how much intellectual work the word "real" is doing in Roberts's opinion.
States always legally have choices, but some of those choices have consequences so undesirable that we
would rather not see them put to that choice. The "real" option is one that avoids painful moral
consequences or consequences inconsistent with the presumed constitutional structure. Which
consequences those are remains a matter of moral and constitutional judgment, all of which is elided in
the Roberts opinion. It is in this sense, as Professor Sullivan pointed out long ago, that all definitions of
coercion are "irreducibly normative." Sullivan, supra note 55, at 1428.
66 Galle, supra note 61, at 919-22; Seigel, supra note 39, at 1656 n. 110.
67 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2659-60 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
68 Id. at 2663.
69 Id
70 Id. at 2662 n.13.
71 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 871 (noting the dissenters' link between crowd-out and
coercion). The dissenters do not explain why spending cuts are off the table as another alternative.
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Academic commentators, too, rely on the crowd-out argument to
explain why states cannot turn to their own revenues.72 For example,
Professor Baker argues that "[w]hen the federal government makes a
conditional offer of funds, states [that dislike the conditions] are severely
constrained in their decisionmaking by the lack of equivalent, alternative
sources of revenue."" She acknowledges that states have their own taxing
authority, but claims that the federal government has a "monopoly power"
over revenues that prevents states from being able to draw on their own
funds.74
In short, all of the coercion arguments appear to rely, either explicitly
or implicitly, on the factual claim that federal taxation squeezes state
revenue capacity." To be sure, there are a number of other questionable
assumptions built into the coercion argument," and perhaps other ways one
might justify limits on conditional spending." But those questions aside,
the crowd-out claim looks to be essential to any persuasive case for the
doctrinal course the Justices have chosen. And while it is uncertain exactly
how future courts will assemble the three NFIB opinions into a "holding,""
it seems likely that no matter how that plays out, the explicit views of four
Justices, and the logically necessary claims of three others, will be central
to future applications.
72 Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 13, at 1936-38; Seigel, supra note 39, at 1656-57.
n Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 13, at 1936.
74 Id. at 1936-38.
75 That is not to say that NFIB or academic commentators have clearly explained what the crowd-
out concept means. Suppose that federal revenues do not absolutely prevent state taxes but merely
increase the economic cost or political pain of collecting them. At what point are the cost and pain so
unacceptable that they are "coercive"? See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 879 (raising this question). What
kinds of state services would have to be threatened by revenue shortfalls for spending cuts, too, to be
coercive? Who decides the baseline of what are essential state services? And, since the entire artifice
rests on claims about voter confusion, when do voters assign "too much" blame to state officials? Given
that there are always plausible arguments for why state officials may have had some role in a concurrent
program, cf Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1265-84, 1297 (2009) (noting that codependency gives state officials power to sway outcomes,
and suggesting that this should reduce judicial concerns over commandeering), the voter-confusion
story necessarily implies that there must be some underlying normative theory of the "right" amount of
blame.
76 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2640-42 & nn. 24-26 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part); Huberfeld et
al., supra note 2, at 42-46.
7 E.g., John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial
Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 89, 118 (2004) (arguing that because state officials do
not internalize the effect of their acts on the whole nation, state decisions to accept grants can diminish
national welfare); Sullivan, supra note 55, at 1492-96 (arguing that, while conditional grants are not
"coercive" in the usual sense, they may still allow the federal government to obtain more power than
the constitutional system prescribes).
7 Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 866-68 & n.24.
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My goal for the remainder of this Article is therefore to try to better
understand what crowd-out means, and to explore whether observable facts
support the Justices' assumption that it happens in the real world.
II. ECONOMIC & POLITICAL THEORIES OF CROWD-OUT
The claim that the federal tax "monopoly" will reduce state taxes
seems to depend on an unstated assumption that the state and federal
governments are wrestling for control of a single resource. But barring a
communist revolution, taxation inevitably leaves a large portion of social
wealth in private hands." In that setting, as I will show, the intuition that
crowd-out rhetoric invokes misses important details. Economic theory does
offer some reasons to believe crowd-out is a possibility. But it also
provides lots of very good reasons for why federal revenues could actually
increase state receipts, especially given existing U.S. institutions. Similarly,
a political analysis of two sovereigns sharing one common pool of funding
could predict either crowd-out or crowd-in, depending on institutions and
quirks of human behavior. In this Part, I begin to tease out the competing
narratives.
Let us start with the simple arithmetic argument. If the federal
government takes all the money, states cannot raise money themselves. If
national revenues were one dollar short of the gross domestic product, there
would not be much room for state government. But in a more realistic
setting, when federal revenues rise, state voters have a choice between
surrendering some private consumption and cutting state taxes. A
persuasive case for crowd-out must explain why voters would necessarily
choose to keep private goods over public goods. I see two basic routes to
that case, one legal and economic, the other largely political.
A. Law & Economics of Crowd-Out
Let me first explain why I say that the crowd-out argument necessarily
assumes a hidden premise that the two sovereigns are tugging at one shared
resource. In the U.S. context there may be more than one resource: federal
and state taxes need not overlap. The Constitution requires that any federal
"direct" tax be apportioned."o Apportionment means that the revenue raised
from the tax must be divided among the states according to their
population; the exact mechanism is tedious, and is set forth in the margin
for readers who have trouble sleeping."' Although the U.S. did impose
79 And even the revolution may leave space for black markets and elites with Swiss bank accounts.
to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
81 In essence, each state pays a fraction of the total national tax equal to its share of the national
population. Suppose the federal government aims to collect $100m in special land taxes. If California
has ten percent of the U.S. population, it would have to pay ten percent of the total federal revenues for
an apportioned tax, or $10m. If there is only one taxpayer in California whose land meets the criteria of
the tax, that person will pay $1Om.
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some apportioned direct taxes in the nineteenth century, it is generally
agreed now that in a modem setting apportionment produces such absurdly
unequal burdens on taxpayers in different states that the federal
government can no longer practically collect direct taxes.82 This means that
there are some things that only states can tax. While the exact definition of
direct taxes remains a little uncertain, they likely at least comprise taxes on
land and "head," or uniform per-person, taxes."
If each source of tax revenue were its own pot of money, then these
constitutional limits on federal taxation would rather weaken the crowd-out
argument. The federal government might exact a high income tax, but
states could respond simply by shifting to real estate and head taxes.
Similarly, at present the national government has very few sales taxes, with
excises on gas and cigarettes as the major exceptions." States can currently
respond to higher federal income taxes simply by collecting more in sales
tax.
The economic reality is a bit more complicated. The "incidence," or
real economic bite, of a tax does not always match its legal label." For
instance, suppose that the reason I go to work is in order to buy myself
shiny things. What if there were a tax on retail purchases? Then the pile of
shiny things I can get by pulling on pants and working is smaller. I might
well prefer to stay in bed. For this reason, most economists believe that part
of the incidence of consumption taxes, which can include the retail sales
tax as well as other taxes on goods and services, falls on labor." That is, it
affects our decision to work, as well as what to buy. Similarly, if there is a
tax on real estate, I might prefer to invest in something else. Because there
is now demand for that something else, its price rises, meaning I cannot
purchase as much of it. Thus, some theorists think that taxes on land in
effect are taxes on all capital investments."
82 Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the
Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 841 (2009).
83 Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) (Roberts, J.); Springer v.
United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) (summarizing the prior one hundred years of doctrine); Dodge,
supra note 82, at 864-75.
4 BRIAN FRANCIS, FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES, INCLUDING THE SLow DEATH OF EXPIRED TAXES
(1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/98excise.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 20:
FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES REPORTED TO OR COLLECTED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU, AND CUSTOMS SERVICE, BY TYPE OF EXCISE TAX,
FISCAL YEARS 1999-2012 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-
20.
85 See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 557-85 (3d ed. 2011).
86 E.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Capital Taxation and Accumulation in a Life Cycle Growth Model,
71 AM. ECON. REV. 533, 538 (1981).
For a review of the theoretical and empirical literature, see Peter Mieszkowski & George R.
Zodrow, Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents,
and Property Taxes, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1098,1110-17, 1127-31 (1989).
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Viewed in this way the crowd-out argument quickly becomes an
empirical one. To what extent do taxes nominally imposed on one base
spill over onto others? Would federal taxes on capital earnings interfere
with state taxes on land? Theory cannot provide an answer; the outcome
depends on how humans respond to changes in the price of different
commodities-the elasticity of demand and supply." And elasticities could
change over time as the population's preferences change.
Even if it were clear that the "indirect" taxes permitted to the federal
government could effectively burden the sources of the "direct" taxes
reserved for states, crowd-out theory still must explain how this overlap
impacts states' finances. When taxes at one level rise, do voters prefer to
give up government services or their private consumption? Or perhaps the
tradeoff is not zero-sum at all. We need a theory of how public funds are
allocated to make a good prediction.
One standard prediction in the public finance literature is that
overlapping taxation by two sovereigns may reduce the total funds
available to either because of the deadweight loss of taxation." Taxes can
change our behavior, as many a wealthy Cayman Islands banker could
attest.90 Sometimes these changes create costs without any offsetting
benefits. For instance, to take advantage of the low tax rates Ireland
imposes on intellectual property, Microsoft, Apple, and many other firms
have set up a series of shell corporations in which profits appear to be
earned in Ireland rather than, say, the United States." Imagine what your
iPad could do if Apple had spent the time and intellectual effort it devoted
to these tax dodges on refining its product instead. These wasted efforts are
known as deadweight loss.92
The deadweight loss generated by one sovereign's taxes can impact
another sovereign dependent on the same sources of revenue." If the
economy is less vibrant because people and businesses are wasting
resources avoiding federal taxation, then state personal and corporate
income taxes will bring in less revenue. That can be the case even if neither
government's tax formally overlaps with the other's. Federal corporate
88 GRUBER, supra note 85, at 564-71.
89 Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 386-87.
90 See JAMES S. HENRY, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, THE PRICE OF OFFSHORE REVISITED 27-36
(2012), available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/PriceofOffshoreRevisited 120722.
pdf (estimating that over $10 trillion in global wealth is hidden in "offshore" financial institutions);
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 727-50 (2011) (describing tax-
reducing possibilities of the U.S. regime for taxation of international business).
91 Kleinbard, supra note 90, at 706-13; Lee Sheppard, How Does Apple Avoid Taxes?, FORBES
(May 28, 2013, 7:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/leesheppard/2013/05/28/how-does-apple-avoid-
taxes/.
92 GRUBER, supra note 85, at 591-601.
9 Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 386-87.
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taxes could potentially reduce state income tax revenues just by distorting
the economy, albeit fairly indirectly.
Economists believe these effects are usually compounded, though,
when both sovereigns are taxing the same things.94 The math underlying the
theory of deadweight loss predicts that losses grow exponentially with the
marginal tax rate." That is, the losses from a tax of 10% are more than
double the losses from a tax of 5%.6 If two sovereigns tax the same base,
each may find that their tax is far more economically costly than they
expected because of the interaction between the two taxes. For instance,
suppose the federal government taxes widgets at 10% and that the state of
Widgetdoom is considering adding its own 10% tax. If consumers consider
these taxes together when they make their purchase decision, in effect the
consumer is looking at a 20% higher price. The standard theory of
deadweight losses predicts that the impact of the new Widgetdoom tax on
the local economy will be considerably larger than if the state imposed an
identical tax with no federal excise. It may therefore no longer be
economically prudent for the state to impose the tax.
It is worth noting that this point, too, rests on some uncertainties. Here
again the elasticity of private responses matters.97 If demand for a good is
highly inelastic-if people do not change their desire for it much when its
price changes-then the deadweight loss of overlapping taxes will be
small." The overlap theory also assumes that individuals will respond to
two different taxes as though they were part of one price. But that is not
necessarily the case. As anyone who has watched an infomercial knows,
and as ample academic research now confirms, consumers do not always
treat different parts of the price of a good, such as shipping and handling
charges, the same as others." Some lab research suggests that individuals
might similarly fail to integrate the effects of separate tax systems.' 0
94 Chemick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515-16.
9 GRUBER, supra note 85, at 594-95.
96 Without dwelling on the math, the intuition is that small changes in price only affect people who
are relatively indifferent to how their decision turns out. GRUBER, supra note 85, at 595. But as the
price effect gets larger, we start to pull in people who feel more and more strongly about the outcome.
9 See Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515 (explaining that the "displacement effect" of
federal tax depends on elasticity of the tax base).
See Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 452, 458 (arguing that vertical tax effects are small when
demand is inelastic); Keen & Kotsogiannis, supra note 23, at 366-67 (modeling the claim that the effect
of federalism on state taxation depends on elasticity of investors' responsiveness to tax).
9 Vicki G. Morwitz et al., Divide and Prosper: Consumers' Reactions to Partitioned Prices, 35 J.
MARKETING RES. 453, 453-63 (1998); see Aradhna Krishna et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of
Price Presentation on Perceived Savings, 78 J. RETAILING 101, 101-18 (2002).
10 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
106, 107 (2006) [hereinafter McCaffery & Baron, Thinking]; Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron,
The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1745, 1765-68 (2005); Edward J.
McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the Evaluation of
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Another well-known interaction between two tax systems also arises
from the fact that taxes change people's behavior. Suppose the government
taxes apples but not pears. Depending on how readily people switch from
one of these to another-the "cross-elasticity" of demand-this differential
taxation might mean more pear eaters.o' A federal apple tax then could
reduce state apple-tax revenues, because there would be fewer apple sales
for the state to tax.'02 That is, substitutions in response to federal tax not
only shrink the state's economy, but also shrink the fraction of the state's
economy subject to tax. The state might raise its rates or tax some other
commodity instead, but if the state tax system had already been optimized
to minimize the total economic burden of taxation, those shifts would again
increase the deadweight loss of state taxation.
An important caveat to the deadweight loss arguments is that existing
state systems are rarely ideal and may well have many available "margins"
on which to adjust their behavior.0 3 For instance, rather than raising their
nominal tax rates in response to federal taxation, states could phase out
some inefficient subsidy, creating an effective tax on the subsidy
recipients." By inserting many of these small phase-outs, the state could
keep all of its tax rates low, avoiding the exponential effects of higher
effective taxes.
Another, less familiar argument the crowd-out theorist could offer is
that overlapping tax bases reduce the revenue-maximizing rate available to
both sovereigns.' Tax rate increases beyond a certain point may reduce
revenues by motivating taxpayers to go to greater efforts to avoid the tax.'
For example, in the United States many states rely primarily on the federal
Tax Systems, 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 230, 231-32 (2003). For a more
comprehensive overview, see Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 72 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 73-77 (2009).
101 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics,
in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991, 1023-37 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,
1987).
102 See Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 386.
103 Cf id. at 387 (noting that states can reduce expenditures rather than raising taxes).
In my prior work I explain why states are especially prone to giving away highly inefficient
subsidy payments. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of
Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REv. 797, 840-44 (2012).
105 See Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, Intra-jurisdictional Tax Competition, 16 CONST. POL.
ECON. 387, 388-89 (2005).
So6 ee JAMES MIRRLEES ET AL., TAX BY DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEw 28-31 (2011);
Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical
Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 6-18 (2012). For evidence, see Jon Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The
Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications, 84 J. PuB. ECON. 1, 6-26 (2002); Wojciech
Kopczuk, Tax Bases, Tax Rates and the Elasticity of Reported Income, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 2093 (2005);
and Emmanuel Saez, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Income: A Panel Study of "Bracket Creep,"
87 J. PUB. ECON. 1231 (2003).
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definition of income for purposes of their own income tax.o' Suppose Ted
Taxpayer has to decide how to report his business income. His reporting
decision will affect both his federal and state income taxes. When Ted
decides how risky or aggressive his reporting position should be, he
rationally should compute the total marginal cost of each dollar of income
his position will cost him.'"t Increases in one government's tax rate could
therefore shrink the tax base for the other, even aside from pure deadweight
losses.
Notice again the empirical uncertainty that lies behind the revenue-
maximization argument. Rate changes by overlapping governments affect
their rivals only to the extent that the total combined rate is high enough to
motivate these kinds of base-affecting decisions. For that to happen, there
must be some shared legal definitions of the tax base. And, again, it must
be the case that taxpayers are rational in the sense that they combine the
two pieces of the tax price together when they make their decisions.'
In short, there is an economic case for crowd-out but it is an uncertain
one. While state and federal governments do not necessarily tax the same
sources, it is possible that the decisions of one can affect the other. Whether
these effects are large, small, or nonexistent depends on conditions on the
ground that cannot easily be predicted in the abstract. And there are still a
number of countervailing possibilities I have not yet considered.
B. The Politics of Crowd-Out
Like the economic case for crowd-out, the political argument, as it has
currently been articulated by scholars, depends on a series of assumptions.
For example, Lynn Baker and others have argued that federal taxation
crowds out states' revenue-raising ability because the tax-paying public has
a limited tolerance for taxation."o But these claims presume that voters
consider state and federal taxation to be substitutes for each other, that state
voters have no way of communicating their preference for lower total tax to
federal officials, and that voters' "utility functions" are stable and
107 Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 975, 1020 (2011).
1os Cf Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 453 (suggesting that total excise taxes may affect
incentives for tax avoidance).
'" As far as I am aware, there is no clear evidence on whether taxpayers respond to combined
federal-state prices as though they were one price. The nearest study is Gruber and Saez, who find no
statistically significant differences in the responses of taxpayers to state and federal tax rates. Gruber &
Saez, supra note 106, at 22-23. If taxpayers do not integrate the two prices, we arguably should see less
responsiveness to state taxes. But then the magnitude of the state rate changes that Gruber and Saez
studied were mostly much smaller than the magnitude of the federal changes, see id. at 13-15 & n.7,
making it hard to know if their results offered a relevant comparison.
1o See supra note 13.
1006
Does Federal Spending "Coerce" States?
additive."' Again, these assumptions may be defensible, but they need
some unpacking.
First, it is a bit of a puzzle why federal taxes would make voters want
fewer state taxes. I may speak only for myself on this point, but having a
new television does not lessen my desire for hot dogs. That is, purchasing
one set of goods-for instance, the bundle of government services one gets
from the federal government in exchange for taxes-should not have any
direct effects on a voter's preferences for another set of distinct goods, such
as the bundle of services they receive from their state or local
governments." 2 To be sure, if voters think of all government as one
indistinguishable mass of "public goods," then it is likely one might
displace the other."3 As the economist Sam Peltzman showed in 1973,
public spending for one specific good is likely to reduce our desire to
purchase (whether from a charity or a second government) another very
similar good."4
We thus seem to have yet another empirical question about how public
preferences work. Do voters see different tiers of government as
interchangeable, such that getting more of one makes us want less of the
other? Or are the two governments two very different bags of groceries?
Looking at the data in the modern United States, government services
at the national and subnational levels are fairly highly differentiated. Both
tiers spend a good deal on health with most state spending via the Medicaid
program."' But that aside, the bulk of national spending is defense,
retirement, and income security, which primarily consist of various transfer
III A "utility function" is a model of how an individual's decisions affect her subjective well-being.
GRUBER, supra note 85, at 26.
112 Cf Joel Huber & Christopher Puto, Market Boundaries and Product Choice: Illustrating
Attraction and Substitution Effects, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 31, 34, 40 (1983) (observing that consumers
sometimes change their purchase decisions based on availability of an "irrelevant" alternative, and
describing this behavior as irrational); Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Product Assortment on Buyer
Preferences, 75 J. RETAILING 347, 348-70 (1999) (same, surveying the marketing literature). The
exception would be if two goods are "complements" or "substitutes" for each other. Simonson, supra,
at 354-55. Chocolate and peanut butter are the tastiest example of the former.
113 This appears to be the standard assumption in many existing economic analyses of crowding.
See, e.g., Andersson et al., supra note 18, at 245 (noting that the authors follow several other papers in
assuming voters have preferences between only three different goods: labor supply, public goods, and
private goods).
114 Sam Peltzman, The Effect of Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: The Case
of Higher Education, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1, 5 (1973). Similarly, one could argue that some voters could
have preferences for the overall size of government or otherwise somehow specifically resent taxes in a
way that they do not resent other goods. But that is a just-so story; there is no ex ante reason to expect
that voters will certainly accept or reject that view.
115 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES TABLES tbl.3
(2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/tables.pdf.
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payments."' Education dominates nonhealth state government spending.
Education and Medicaid combined currently make up two-thirds of state
budgets; transportation is a distant third at less than 8%."' This split is not
new and probably not a coincidence; basic fiscal federalism theory predicts
that national defense and redistribution should be national functions."'
Voters may be rationally ignorant, but such dramatic, persistent differences
seem difficult to overlook. So while it is certainly not inconceivable that
voters view the two governments as interchangeable, it would be
surprising.
Another well-known way that federal taxes could affect voter demand
for unrelated state taxes is through what is known as the income effect."'
Sometimes having more money changes our preferences for stuff: not
many millionaires ride the bus. For most things, which economists
logically enough call "normal" goods, demand increases with income. 20
There is evidence that many state services are normal goods, although
some theorists differ. 2' In any event, the argument would be that federal
taxes, by reducing the wealth of state voters, diminish their demand for
government services.
But this neglects federal spending. Some states take in more federal
total dollars than their citizens pay in taxes, suggesting that demand for
state taxes should actually increase in those states.'22 At the individual
level, recent estimates suggest that the median American voter receives a
net benefit from federal taxing and spending.'23 Wealthier voters are net
116 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013
HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT tbl.3.2, at 74 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/hist.pdf.
117 NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING FISCAL
2009-2011 STATE SPENDING 3 (2011), available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2010%20
State%20Expenditure%20Report.pdf.
118 See GRUBER, supra note 85, at 274; Charles C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates, Assistance to the
Poor in a Federal System, 32 J. PUB. ECON. 307, 328 (1987).
119 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515-16.
120 GRUBER, supra note 85, at G-7.
121 Daniel Hewitt, Demand for National Public Goods: Estimates from Surveys, 23 EcON. INQUIRY
487, 503 (1985). But see BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 69-70 (1977).
122 See Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Spending Received by State, 1981-2005, TAX FOUND. (Oct.
19, 2007), http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-taxes-paid-vs-federal-spending-received-state-1981-
2005; Cary M. Atlas et al., Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses,
and Why, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 624, 626-28 (1995). I assume for the purposes of argument here that
income effects resulting from transfers of funds to a general population in fact alter political outcomes
in the same way they alter preferences. In fact, I think that is unclear, but further explication will have
to await later work.
123 See The Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes, 2008 and 2009, Supplemental
Table 7, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (July 10, 2012), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43373; Greg Mankiw,
The Progressivity of Taxes and Transfers, GREG MANKIW'S BLOG (July 14, 2012),
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2012/07/progressivity-of-taxes-and-transfers.html (noting that CBO's
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payors by the definition of the estimators. 124 Even assuming that voters
perceive the value of government benefits in the same way the study
authors did,'25 the net income effect is unclear: wealthy voters are
politically more potent but of course fewer in number. That is usually a
prescription for the victory of the minority, 126 but on occasion policy
entrepreneurs can awaken the sleeping giant and the majority prevails.'27
Once again, theory does not give us a clear prediction.
A second assumption the political story relies on is that, even if federal
taxes and state taxes are substitutes, it is state taxes that are the loser in any
political conflict. Rick Hills has made this point, but it is worth elaborating
just a bit.128 As Hills argues, voters could well prefer state to federal
services, and so any overlap may tend to reduce the size of the national
government rather than states.'29 A counterargument could be that the
federal government is a kind of "Stackelberg leader," a game-theoretic term
for a player whose dominant market position gives it a first-mover
advantage.' If Congress sees itself as a single entity in competition with
states, perhaps it could, like a monopolist pushing around tiny competitors,
use its economies of scale in national revenue raising to keep states from
claiming too much of its tax "market."
This counter raises a host of additional questions. Recent observers of
Congress may note that shared purpose is not exactly a hallmark of the
institution. Party allegiances and partisan advantage play important roles
and, as advocates of the "political safeguards of federalism" have pointed
figures imply that the median voter is a net recipient of federal transfers, but cautioning that data may
change with complete inclusion of state figures).
124 Mankiw, supra note 123.
125 For example, some wealthy voters may view transfer payments to others as a social good
they've purchased with their taxes. Others may see any provision of public goods with their own money
as a "common disaster" they would have preferred to avoid.
126 See Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and Section 164
of the Tax Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673, 705-06 (2007) (arguing that standard public choice theory predicts
that overlapping tax bases will increase political pressure to cut taxes).
127 See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment-Explanations for
Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 29, 49-56 (1998). For an empirical
examination of how federal distributions to states are determined, see Gary A. Hoover & Paul Pecorino,
The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level, 123 PUB. CHOICE 95, 103-10
(2005).
128 Hills, supra note 37, at 865.
129 Id. For additional arguments along these lines, see Galle, supra note 126, at 707-08. For
evidence that subnational taxes affect federal tax choices, albeit in a Canadian setting, see Masayoshi
Hayashi & Robin Boadway, An Empirical Analysis of Intergovernmental Tax Interaction: The Case of
Business Income Taxes in Canada, 34 CANADIAN J. ECON. 481, 501-02 (2001).
130 See Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 385 (modeling the U.S. government as a Stackelberg
leader); Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, Efficiency and the Optimal Direction of Federal-State
Transfers, 3 INT'L TAx & PUB. FIN. 137, 138 (1996) (same).
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out, may serve as levers for states to preserve their own interests."'
Congress's collective fiscal interests are also a public good for the
members of Congress, meaning that if an interest group can offer an
individual member private rewards for protecting the group's desires, the
member has strong incentives to favor the group over the interests of
Congress as a whole.'32 Members of Congress may therefore be more
attached to state constituencies who are devoted to lowering federal taxes
than they are to their own budget authority.
Put another way, the crowd-out argument appears to assume that
federal political actors will not internalize the impact of federal budgets on
state finances."' But in fact state-level actors have a wide variety of tools
for ensuring that federal officials do just that. Whether they utilize those
tools is a different question, and may depend on the political structure of
the federal enactment. As Mark Seidenfeld and I have argued in a related
context, federal enactments with low partisan valence and thin impacts
across many states might lead to free riding, while politically charged
changes, or threats to a major interest group or a small cluster of states,
would be more likely to trigger intense opposition.'34 But admittedly these
are broad theoretical predictions of the average outcome, not guarantees
that states will win or lose any given fight.
A final source of uncertainty lies in the third assumption I mentioned,
the assumption that state voters' preferences for policy outcomes really
respond to simple math in the way that the political crowd-out story seems
to require. As I mentioned earlier, there are good reasons to suspect that
voters actually do not jointly consider the total burden of taxation imposed
by separate governments: they "anchor" on the larger number, or they keep
separate mental accounts of the two tax burdens, or state tax burdens are
simply less salient overall."' A long tradition of conservative economic
thought maintains that federated government, by breaking up and
131 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 278-86 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Franita Tolson, Benign
Partisanship, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 395, 416-27 (2012).
132 For empirical evidence of this phenomenon, see Brian Galle, The Politics of Federalism: Self-
interest or Safeguards? Evidence from Congressional Control of State Taxation, in HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1759510.
1 Cf Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 387 (noting that their model assumes the federal tax setter
does not account for state revenue effects); Esteller-Mord & Sold-1Oll6, Canada, supra note 18, at 249-
52 (noting that the federal government can use grants to undo any distortions caused by crowd-out).
134 Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation,
and Agencies at the Edge ofFederal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1964-66 (2008).
13 McCafferey & Baron, Thinking, supra note 100, at 122-23, 132; Edward J. McCaffery &
Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 289, 290-91 (2006). For more detailed discussion, see Brian Galle, Federal
Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the "SALT" Deduction, 106 MICH.
L. REv. 805, 815-18 (2008).
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shrouding the total size of government, allows for a higher total tax than
unitary government would, although evidence of that proposition remains
elusive."'
Voter preferences may also be contingent, rather than "exogenous" or
determined independent of the existing political and legal rules. Suppose
that federal revenues cause crowd-out under one set of legal arrangements,
but would not cause crowd-out under another. In that case, should the
federal government be prohibited from imposing conditions on its
spending, or instead should the legal rules that cause crowd-out give way?
To take one example, if the U.S. had more generous "revenue sharing"
along the lines of the Canadian model, many poorer states would have
greater resources."' In those states it would presumably be easier for
taxpayers to absorb the economic strain of increased state revenue
demands."' Alternately, crowd-out of state revenues would very likely
diminish sharply if all state taxes were fully creditable against federal
taxation. If we only observe crowd-out in the absence of revenue sharing,
should the logic of coercion demand fewer conditions on federal grants, or
instead more generous federal support for states?
Similarly, the states' existing laws may determine voter preferences. If
states could readily borrow, upward shocks in fiscal demand could be
smoothed out over time, diminishing the impact at least of temporary
changes in federal taxation."' But it is states' own budgeting rules that
impair their borrowing capacity. 40 Those rules are a defensible response to
136 Brian E. Dollery & Andrew C. Worthington, The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion, 10 J.
ECON. SuRvs. 261, 264-65, 270-71, 293-94 (1996); Keen & Kotsogiannis, supra note 23, at 364-65,
369.
137 See Richard M. Bird & Michael Smart, Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: International
Lessons for Developing Countries, 30 WORLD DEv. 899, 900-07 (2002) (describing the basic goals and
outcomes of revenue sharing); Robin Boadway, Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of
Fiscal Decentralization, 12 CONST. POL. ECON. 93, 112-16 (2001) (explaining the role of equalization
grants in a decentralized system).
Kelders & Koethenbuerger, supra note 17, at 684-85, 690 (claiming that revenue sharing
reduces fiscal pressure).
139 See Arik Levinson, Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the States, 51 NAT'L
TAX J. 715, 717-19 (1998) (describing the relationship between state borrowing and state ability to
weather fiscal crises). Borrowing diminishes the impact of revenue shocks for a number of reasons.
Perhaps the most straightforward is the relation between deadweight loss and tax rates. Robert J. Barro,
On the Determination of the Public Debt, 87 J. POL. ECON. 940, 943-45 (1979). For a state that starts at
a 10% tax, ten years of 11% taxes are much less distortive than one year of 20% taxes. See id
Additionally, there are good reasons to think that as a political matter present voters and officials will
view the burden of debts as less than the burden of an equivalent present discounted value of tax
increases. For an extended discussion of that point, see Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and
the Social Safety Net: The Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L.
REv. 187, 199-200 (2010).
140 Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 915-16 (2003); Brian Knight & Arik Levinson, Fiscal
1011
108:989 (2014)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
predictable political failures at the state level.'41 But again they pose the
question: if crowd-out is contingent on the presence of these state rules,
why should the legal burden of coercion fall on conditional spending,
rather than the rules that contribute to crowd-out?
Lastly on this point, federal anticoercion laws may themselves cause
crowd-out. States have several possible tools for preparing for unexpected
fiscal demands. Borrowing, again, is one of these, and so is saving.'42 But if
the Supreme Court guarantees that states will not be subjected to sharp new
financial demands from the federal government, the state has less reason to
build those kinds of revenue-smoothing institutions. In essence, the
coercion doctrine is a bailout, a promise of assistance in the event of fiscal
emergencies.'43 In that scenario, crowd-out is the result of moral hazard: the
state fails to take action to protect itself against fiscal shocks because it has
judicially provided insurance against the shock.'"
Overall, the political argument for crowd-out is uncertain. While some
of the uncertainties are relatively deep conceptual questions about the
nature of voter preferences, others are straightforward questions about how
voters and political officials behave. Those questions, at least, are testable,
as I hope to show shortly.
III. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CROWD-IN
Despite all the possible arguments I have just set out, the reported
conventional wisdom among state budget analysts is that state revenues
tend to rise together with federal revenues.'45 That is, federal revenues
might actually crowd-in state revenues. Why might that be? One set of
potential reasons involves the close relationship between state taxing
systems and the federal income tax. Another relates to the way that voters
may form preferences about the size and cost of government.
First, though, it may be useful to sort out a definitional issue. In one
sense it should be completely unsurprising that state and federal revenues
tend to have a strong positive correlation, because both are usually imposed
Institutions in U.S. States, in INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS AND FISCAL POLICY 167, 169-70 & tbl.1 (Rolf R.
Strauch & Jilrgen von Hagen eds., 2000); Levinson, supra note 139, at 717.
141 Galle & Klick, supra note 139, at 198-204.
142 Russell S. Sobel & Randall G. Holcombe, The Impact of State Rainy Day Funds in Easing State
Fiscal Crises During the 1990-1991 Recession, 16 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 1996, at 28, 28-29.
143 For accessible explanations of the dynamics of "bailouts," see Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of
Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 491-508 (2011), and Jeffrey Manis, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for
a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1358-70 (2011).
144 See Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal Behavior:
Insurance Versus Aggregate Discipline, 62 J. INT'L ECON. 149, 153-54 (2004) (noting that federal
guarantees can induce fiscal recklessness by local governments).
14S C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAx POLICY 34-36 (2d ed. 2008); Alysoun
McLaughlin, National Conference of State Legislatures, The Impact of Federal Tax Policy Decisions on
States' Budgets (2003) ("As a rule, when federal taxes go up or down, so do state taxes.").
1012
Does Federal Spending "Coerce" States?
on sources of funds that vary with the strength of the economy.'" When the
economy is booming, income and sales tax revenues often are .too.1 47
Because property values are stickier, and assessed property values stickier
still, property taxes are less variable, but are still somewhat sensitive to
economic conditions.148 So perhaps this is all that analysts mean when they
say that government revenues move together: most governments' revenues
are affected by economic conditions.
The crowd-in I have in mind is something different. For either crowd-
out or crowd-in, it seems the key question is whether federal policies make
it more or less difficult for the state to raise money, all else equal. To
observe whether causation exists in this way, arguably the better measure
of crowding would therefore hold economic conditions constant, as would
be the case if we measured the effects of federal tax on state revenues as a
percentage of the state's wealth, or "gross domestic product." On the other
hand, I have already suggested some ways in which tax's effects on the
economy can itself contribute to crowd-out (and, as I will show in a
moment, crowd-in). So maybe the most precise measure of crowding
would be to hold all non-tax-related changes in the economy constant.
Unfortunately, it rarely will be possible to cleanly separate out the tax-
related changes in economic conditions from those that arose
independently, which will complicate my econometric analysis.'49 For now,
my only point is that when I refer to crowd-in, I am describing those effects
that are most closely related to the federal tax system.
Another possibility the budget analysts may have in mind, and that
would not be much relevant for my inquiry, is that what looks like crowd-
in may instead be changes in voter demand for government. Voters might
simultaneously agree to higher taxes for both their state and federal
governments because they decide they want more of some service that both
governments provide.' Health care would be the major contemporary
example here."' But this simultaneous change in demand does not really
tell us much about crowding theory, since that would be a mere correlation,
while the question crowd-out theorists seem to have in mind is whether
federal taxation actually causes states' diminished ability to tax.
14 Russell S. Sobel & Randall G. Holcombe, Measuring the Growth and Variability of Tax Bases
over the Business Cycle, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 535, 543 tbl.2 (1996).
147 See Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REv. 407,419-23 (2010).
148 Darien Shanske, How Less Can Be More: Using the Federal Income Tax to Stabilize State and
Local Finance, 31 VA. TAX REv. 413, 450-52 (2012).
149 Further, since in some sense all economic conditions in a democracy depend on the existence of
government, a separation between tax-related and other kinds of economic changes may not offer a
clear conceptual boundary. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES
AND JUSTICE 32-37 (2002).
1so Cf Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 395 (identifying factors that might cause simultaneous
changes in federal and state tax rates).
151 See supra text accompanying notes 115-18.
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Turning to crowd-in itself, then, many economists have hypothesized
that the interrelated structures of state and federal tax systems tie together
the paths of federal and state revenues. A key component of that
relationship is the federal income tax deduction for taxes paid to state and
local governments.152 Federal taxpayers who itemize can reduce their
federal taxable income by the amount of income and property taxes they
paid to other governments.' Currently, itemizers also have the option of
swapping their state income tax deduction for a deduction for the amount
of general sales tax they pay, a handy choice for residents of states like
Texas and Florida that lack an income tax.154
Crucially for the crowd-in argument, the dollar value of a deduction
increases when federal income tax rates rise."' Deductions reduce taxable
income, not taxes due. So each dollar of deduction reduces the size of the
check the taxpayer must write to the government by her marginal tax rate
times the amount of the deduction."' In effect, the federal government is
offering a matching grant to its taxpayers for the purchase of state and local
government."' When federal rates go up, the value of the matching grant
increases.' Furthermore, to the extent that households view federal taxes
paid as lost income, a deduction makes them feel subjectively richer. If
state government is a normal good, this income effect, too, should increase
their demand for state services.' For some taxpayers, though-mostly
homeowners or large families whose incomes fall between $100,000 and
$500,000-the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) will claw back the value
of the state and local deduction.'60
152 Chemick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 510-11.
153 I.R.C. § 164 (2012). "Itemizing" means that the taxpayer has chosen to claim a bundle of
individual tax benefits, rather than the "standard" deduction. JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 32 (16th ed. 2012). In 2014, the standard deduction for a single filer is $6200, Rev.
Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 541, meaning that taxpayers should choose to itemize if their bundle of
benefits adds up to more than that.
154 Sales tax deductibility was repealed in 1986, but reinstated in its current optional form in 2004.
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 501, 118 Stat. 1418, 1520-21 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 164(b)(5) (2012)).
155 See Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 511 (noting relation between value of deductibility
and income).
156 For instance, when Theresa Taxpayer takes a $10,000 deduction, the amount she saves on her
tax bill depends on her marginal rate. If she earns $1 million per year, putting her in the highest bracket,
she will have a 39.6% marginal rate, meaning the deduction will save her $3960.
157 McLure & Zodrow, supra note 16.
158 Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic
Stabilizers, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 37.
1 See Stephen J. Bailey & Stephen Connolly, The Flypaper Effect: Identifying Areas for Further
Research, 95 PUB. CHOICE 335, 336 (1998) (explaining separate income and substitution effects of
matching grants).
10 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). For more details on the relation between the AMT and
§ 164, see Galle & Klick, supra note 139, at 210-17.
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A similar provision is the federal tax exemption for income earned on
bonds issued by state and local governments.' Because interest is tax free
for holders of the bonds, states can offer a below-market rate of interest and
still be competitive with taxable bond issuers.162 Again, the size of this
discount increases with the federal income tax rate, since that rate
represents the amount of money exempt-bond purchasers save relative to
buying a taxable bond. As a result, state taxpayers face a lower overall
price of government.'63 The highest income bondholders may also be net
enriched by the combination of tax exemption and lower bond rates,"
leading to an income effect that could drive up demand for government
services."' Even if tax-exempt bonds do not lead to crowd-in, they should
mitigate the impact of unexpected federal demands on state revenues by
lowering borrowing costs, allowing the state to spread out the burden over
time.'66
Crowd-in may also be a product of overlapping legal definitions and
enforcement.' 7 Most states define income as based in significant part on
the federal definition.' 8 Thus, when Congress expands its tax base, state
bases expand as well.' As I and others have explained before, while
sharing definitions does cede some policy primacy to the federal
government, it also greatly simplifies life for state taxpayers, and allows
state enforcement efforts to piggyback on the federal government and other
161 § 103.
162 Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1030, 1042 (1983). For more details on the bond program, see Shanske, supra note 148, at 434-
45.
163 See Gillette, supra note 162, at 1046-47 (noting that tax-exempt bonds are equivalent to federal
grants to borrowers).
164 See Robert P. Huefher, Municipal Bonds: The Costs and Benefits of an Alternative, 23 NAT'L
TAX J. 407, 409 (1970) (explaining that exempt bond buyers receive a windfall if their tax rate is above
the rate of the marginal purchaser). Top tax bracket bondholders sometimes come out ahead by buying
exempt bonds because the price of the bond may be set to compete for the business of buyers in a lower
bracket. For instance, let's say the market rate for bonds issued by nonexempts with credit comparable
to the State of Indebtedness would be 10%. The State initially offers its bonds at 6.5%, assuming that
this price will leave buyers in the 35% bracket indifferent between their product and a competitor. What
if it does not manage to sell all its bonds? It may then raise its rates to 7% to capture the business of
buyers in the 30% bracket. Buyers whose marginal rate is 35% then reap a 0.5% windfall.
165 See Gillette, supra note 162, at 1052-54 (noting income effect of exemption generally).
166 Cf Barro, supra note 139, at 942-45 (suggesting that borrowing allows governments to
overcome temporary drops in revenue or increases in demand more efficiently).
167 See Esteller-Mord & Sol6-Olli, Canada, supra note 18, at 241, 253; Helen F. Ladd, State
Responses to the TRA86 Revenue Windfalls: A New Test of the Flypaper Effect, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 82, 82 (1993).
168 Chemick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 510.
169 Ruth Mason, Delegating up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267,
1269 (2013).
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states.' For example, relative to individual state revenue agencies, the IRS
has massive economies of scale, and, with its web of state- and
international-data sharing, access to a more complete picture of each
taxpayer's economic life."' More effective enforcement not only saves
states money but also likely reduces the elasticity of taxable income-that
is, diminishes taxpayers' incentives to take aggressive reporting positions,
increasing the amount of revenue states can collect at any given tax rate.
The benefits of shared enforcement are not necessarily static, and may
well rise as the federal tax rate rises. In theory, it would be rational for the
federal government to anticipate that its own tax increases would
incentivize more creative tax accounting.'72 Federal officials should
therefore audit more intensively when rates are higher, or at a minimum
devote more audit attention to taxpayers in higher brackets."' The latter, at
least, fits with the available publicly known facts about IRS practices.
Another source of crowd-in, then, might be the revenue benefits states
realize when federal auditors ratchet up their efforts.
Shared enforcement resources may be especially important in the
taxation of multijurisdictional taxpayers and cross-border transactions.
When the tax base for each taxable unit is divided among several
jurisdictions, the temptation for taxpayers to report their affairs in such a
way as to allocate a larger share of the base to low-tax sovereigns is
substantial. Information-sharing regimes can help to overcome this
problem, but low-tax jurisdictions (sometimes called "tax havens") have
incentives to under share.' 74 A credible central repository of data, such as
that provided to states by the federal government, may mitigate the ability
of taxpayers to shift income across borders, and again the information-
checking effort expended by the federal authorities rationally should
increase with their own tax rate.
Another set of theoretical arguments for crowd-in rests on predictions
about how voters form preferences for how much to tax themselves. The
170 Galle, supra note 126, at 702-04; Mason, supra note 169, at 1279-88; Mason, supra note 107,
at 1020; Kim Rueben & Kirk J. Stark, Federal Tax Reform and the Deduction for State and Local Taxes
5 (May 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2012/stark.
pdf. In addition, an automatically expanding base could enlarge state revenues if officials want higher
taxes and state-level voters are inattentive to the automatic expansions. Research on whether that effect
in fact occurs has been inconclusive. Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal
Illusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RUSSELL MATrHEWS
65, 66-71 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988).
171 Galle, supra note 126, at 703.
172 Saez et al., supra note 106.
173 There are also other alternatives, although mostly unexplored by domestic revenue authorities.
See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement,
109 COLUM. L. REv. 689, 710-40 (2009).
174 Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L. REv. 605, 628-
30, 655-57 (2008).
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simplest of these I have discussed already: income effects. An expanding
federal government can enrich many state residents. Some states on net
receive more federal transfers than they pay in taxes."' Others, such as
Maryland and Virginia, may be home to large numbers of federal
contractors and employees."' And, notwithstanding the occasional $800
toilet seat, some federal revenues may actually be used for good
investments that expand the economy.'
More subtly, Besley and Case have argued that voters may decide how
much tax they want based on "yardstick competition"-comparisons
between governments."' If my neighbors are paying 10% of their income
to their state, my own governor's proposal to hike taxes from 8% to 9%
seems more reasonable. Although Besley and Case focus on horizontal
competition among states, other commentators suggest that voters may also
compare governments vertically. 7 9 While there is little direct evidence of
vertical yardstick comparison, if it exists it could cause crowd-in: voters
may be more inclined to see higher state taxes as a good deal when federal
government is quite expensive.
Proponents of the so-called "Leviathan" theory of government tell a
related vertical competition story that focuses instead on the incentives of
government officials. In these accounts society's total available resources
are a common pool from which both federal and state officials must "fish"
for taxes.' Leviathan theorists assume that officials have self-interested
175 See sources cited supra note 122. Of course, this would imply crowd-out in net payor states.
176 See Federal Employees by State, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.con/gov-data/federal-
employees-workforce-numbers-by-state.html (last visited June 7, 2014) (approximately 145,000 federal
jobs in Maryland and 175,000 federal jobs in Virginia).
17 Cf Bev Dahlby & Leonard S. Wilson, Vertical Fiscal Externalities in a Federation, 87 J. PUB.
ECON. 917, 921-27 (2003) (modeling the claim that state taxation can increase federal revenues by
improving productivity of labor and therefore taxable income).
1 Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick
Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 25, 41 (1995); Pierre Salmon, Horizontal Competition Among
Governments, in HANDBOOK OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 61, 73-77 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio
eds., 2006). However, this evidence is not consistently supported across all data. See Timothy Besley &
Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States, 41 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 7, 50-51 (2003) [hereinafter Besley & Case, Policy Choices]; see also Esteller-Mord &
Sol6-Oll6, Canada, supra note 18, at 253 (finding evidence consistent with horizontal yardstick
competition in Canada).
'7 E.g., Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich W. Ursprung, Political Yardstick Competition, Economic
Integration, and Constitutional Choice in a Federation: A Numerical Analysis of a Contest Success
Function Model, 124 PUB. CHOICE 329, 331 (2005); see also Chemick & Tennant, supra note 18, at
518 (suggesting that federal tax increases may serve as a "first-mover signal" to states).
18o Dahlby & Wilson, supra note 177, at 918-19; Michael Keen, Vertical Tax Externalities in the
Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 454, 459 (1998); see also Br~ilhart & Jametti,
supra note 18, at 2028 (suggesting that a common pool problem arises whenever officials maximize
their own constituency's welfare); Ingemar Hanson & Charles Stuart, The Suboptimality of Local
Taxation Under Two-Tier Fiscal Federalism, 3 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 407 (1987) (modeling shared budget
as a common pool).
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reasons for wanting to maximize the revenues available for their own use."'
Given this assumption, and the further assumption that there are limited
fish in the pond, basic game theory predicts that each competitor should
want to catch the fish before their rivals get them all.182 If each competitor
fears that her rival's efforts will ultimately crowd out her own, competition
may encourage all the participants to increase their taxing efforts.
To sum up, there is a strong theoretical case for crowd-in. To my eye
that case is stronger than the predictions of crowd-out. But both seem
plausible. Indeed, both sets of predictions may be right, so that there could
well be strong influences in each direction. We have therefore come to the
end of what theory can likely tell us. At this point, we need evidence.
IV. PRIOR EVIDENCE ON CROWDING
In this Part, I will examine the existing evidence on whether federal
revenues displace state funds. The evidence is thin, so my summary will be
brief. In general, although there is no prior research directly on the effects
of total federal revenues on total state revenues, there are two sets of
narrower studies on related questions that could be relevant to my question
here. Taken together, though, these narrower studies are fairly
inconclusive.
The first set of studies examines whether federal taxation crowds out
state taxation of the same tax base. For example, a series of papers has
studied whether federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline reduce state
taxes on cigarettes and gasoline, respectively.'83 Some find that federal
taxes increase state tax rates for the same commodity,'84 while others find
no such effect or that the effect varies over time or commodity.' One
paper finds crowd-out.' 6 Other papers focus on the income tax. Again,
181 Keen, supra note 180, at 455.
182 Christopher Berry, Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common-Pool, 52 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 802, 805-06 (2008).
183 Eg., Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 451-52; Esteller-Mord & Rizzo, supra note 15, at 359-
76.
'4 Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 392.
185 Devereux et al., supra note 15, at 452, 469; Esteller-Mord & Rizzo, supra note 15, at 355.
Because the Esteller-Mord and Rizzo study is able to better account for the possible impact of non-tax-
related economic events, and incorporates Devereux et al.'s insight that horizontal and vertical tax
effects may interact, I find its results more convincing than others. See Esteller-Mord & Rizzo, supra
note 15, at 356-57.
186 Fredriksson & Mamun, supra note 18, at 35-36. Fredriksson and Mamun suggest that their
results differ from others because they add controls for the state-level political influence of smokers and
tobacco companies. Id. at 36. They also employ a putative measure of state corruption, which they
measure by the number of federal corruption convictions. Id. For a variety of reasons, that outcome is
probably a very poor measure of actual corruption. For example, corrupt state officials might well be
better at warding off convictions when corruption is widespread enough to affect the federal
prosecutor's future job prospects in the state. More problematically, the corruption measure could be
correlated with other factors that would confound their results. To take one example, successful
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some find evidence of crowd-in,' while others find the opposite, although
the latter are all in the international context."' Chernick and Tennant look
jointly at income and consumption taxes, finding that although states may
respond to federal taxation by shifting their tax base to favor wealthier
voters, these shifts are overall revenue neutral.'" However, it is unclear
whether Chemick and Tennant consider concurrent changes in other
sources of revenue, such as corporate taxes and user fees. They also use
simulated individual burdens rather than real statewide collections, and
combine state and local effects, while our question here is state-level fiscal
effects. "I
In interpreting many of these studies it is important to distinguish
changes in state tax rates from changes in the amount of funds states are
able to raise from their tax. Again, if federal taxation diminishes a state's
tax base-for example, if federal gas taxes motivate Escalade drivers to
switch to an Escape or a Smart car-then state rates might rise to preserve
total revenue levels.19 ' The reverse is also possible; good federal
investments could expand the state economy and allow for lower rates.'92
Then again, higher rates usually mean more money. So it is ambiguous,
looking at rates alone, whether state revenues on net are moving in the
same direction.' Since the question posed by the NFIB decision is whether
federal taxes reduce states' ability to bring in funds, the relevant data point
is total revenues, not tax rates. Therefore the tax-rate studies, even if they
were more conclusive than they are, would not actually tell us a great deal
about the coercion problem.
prosecutions could correlate with greater federal resources devoted to the state, which could in turn
affect state demand for public goods. It would therefore be interesting to know whether Fredriksson and
Mamun would reach the same result if they dropped that variable, which they found to have significant
effects. Id.
187 Brdilhart & Jametti, supra note 18 (Swiss cantons and municipalities); Esteller-Mor6 & Sold-
0116, Canada, supra note 18, at 249 (Canada).
188 Andersson et al., supra note 18, at 255-56 (Swedish local and municipal governments);
Timothy J. Goodspeed, Tax Competition and Tax Structure in Open Federal Economies: Evidence from
OECD Countries with Implications for the European Union, 46 EUR. ECON. REv. 357, 372 (2002); see
also Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 508 (noting that U.S. studies find crowd-in while studies of
other jurisdictions sometimes find crowd-out).
189 Chemick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 531.
190 Id. at 521-22.
191 See Besley & Rosen, supra note 18, at 386 ("An increase in federal taxes on goods that are also
taxed by the state implies that the states have to raise their rates in order to maintain their revenues.").
192 Fredriksson and Mamun argue that their tax rate results also imply lower state revenues.
Fredriksson & Mamun, supra note 18, at 47. But lower rates imply lower revenues only if there are no
offsetting expansions in the tax base-for example, if more individuals buy tobacco because the tax is
lower. Fredriksson and Mamun offer no evidence on tax base in either direction. Also, their study does
not tell us anything about whether states offset any possible loss in tobacco-tax revenues with other
revenues or spending cuts.
193 Chernick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 516.
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Studies of the impact of federal deductibility on state taxes supply
another source of potential evidence. Unfortunately, the literature as a
whole offers murky results.'94 Some authors find that deductibility
increases state tax receipts,' 5 while others find that it affects only the form
but not the amount of total state taxes.'96 Further, because many of these
deductibility studies do not account for the potentially confounding effects
of other federal-state interactions, their results may not be fully reliable."
Existing studies may help to refine some of the causal mechanisms
that might contribute to crowd-out or crowd-in, though. For example, by
comparing Canadian provinces whose laws automatically tracked national
tax rules with those that did not, Esteller-Mor6 and Sol6-Oll6 found some
modest evidence that Quebec, which did not track national law, was less
sensitive to national tax rates than other provinces.' 8 That tends to support
the idea that shared definitions are important to crowding. Similarly, Ladd
found that the extensive federal tax reforms of 1986, in which the federal
government eliminated many existing loopholes, boosted state budgets.'"
Chernick and Tennant's findings about the shifting distribution of state tax
bases lend some support to the hypothesis that income effects of federal
taxation may vary by income level. And Agrawal finds that municipalities
respond more strongly to state taxes than states do to federal taxes, which
he interprets as evidence that the elasticity of the tax base is important to
crowding effects.2 00
At this point it should be obvious that even taken all together, the
literature does not appear to offer clear predictions about crowd-out.
Changes in tax rates or revenues for one tax instrument do not tell us what
is happening at the same time to other state revenues or state borrowing.
The effects of one influence, such as deductibility or base overlap, do not
show us the combined impact of all federal influences. More evidence is
needed.
V. ORIGINAL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CROWDING
In order to test the competing crowd-out and crowd-in hypotheses, I
construct a dataset of U.S. state and federal budgets and other control
194 Kaplow, supra note 21.
19 Holtz-Eakin & Rosen, supra note 20; Metcalf, supra note 20; see also Galle & Klick, supra
note 139, at 217 (finding that deductibility affects state countercyclical spending); Gramlich, supra note
20, at 453-58 (reporting that deductibility increases demand for state and local public goods).
196 Chemick & Tennant, supra note 18, at 515-20; Courant & Gramlich, supra note 20, at 244-53.
1 Esteller-Mor6 & Sold-Oll6, US, supra note 18, at 252 n.5.
198 Esteller-Mor6 & Sold-Oll6, Canada, supra note 18, at 241, 252.
1 Ladd, supra note 167.
200 David R. Agrawal, Inter-federation Competition: Sales Taxation with Multiple Federations 27
(Aug. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-dagrawall
research files/AgrawalIFC.pdf.
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variables, covering the years 1998 to 2010. I build a panel by collecting
yearly information at the state level; that is, for each year, I have forty-eight
observations, one representing each state.201 I then use regression analysis
to identify statistical correlations between state and federal budgets,
holding constant other factors that might influence the two.
A. Methodology
The regression analyses I report here take the form of what are known
as fixed-effects panel regressions.202 In essence, what this means is that I
will attempt to use the variation within each state from year to year to
explain what causes state budgets to grow or shrink. Over time, the forces
affecting each state budget, such as the size of federal revenues, the state's
wealth and population, and the amount of state taxes residents claim as
deductions on their federal returns, will change. Other aspects of the state,
such as its constitution, political tradition, and important budget
institutions, are assumed to be unchanging, and so are held constant-
hence the term "fixed effects" regression.203
As I discussed in Part III, the ideal measure of federal-state influence
would be to observe what happens to state revenues as federal revenues
change, holding constant any non-tax-related changes in the economy, but
in the real world we cannot tell which economic changes are caused by
taxes. Therefore I approximate the ideal measure by using two different
dependent variables,204 state revenues as a portion of state GDP and per
capita state own-source revenues. State revenues as a percentage of GDP
could be underinclusive, in that it largely ignores deadweight loss or
economic expansion caused by federal taxes. Per capita state revenues
alone may be overinclusive: it will reflect economic conditions with only
attenuated relations to federal tax. So by using both, I hope to bracket the
correct answer. Reassuringly, my results are essentially identical under
either approach.
I measure federal tax burdens using a combination of federal revenues
collected in each state, and the revenues collected in geographically
adjacent states.205 In the absence of any identifiable shock that affects
201 Because some of my key variables depend on geographically adjacent states, I omit Alaska and
Hawaii.
202 1 describe additional technical details about the construction and analysis of the data, including
a wide variety of alternative "specifications," or research designs, in a related paper. Brian Galle, The
Effect of National Revenues on Sub-national Revenues: Evidence from the U.S., 37 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 147, 150-54 (2014).
203 JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS 222-23
(2009).
204 The "dependent" variable is typically the outcome whose influences we are hoping to measure.
205 Although in theory I would like to observe the influence of all national revenues on each state's
budget, this is impractical statistically. Since federal revenues of course do not vary across states for
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federal revenues without also directly impacting state budgets, my main
source of identification will come from variations in federal effective rates,
base definitions, and collection efforts, which in turn may vary with the
composition of state populations and over time. Federal revenues collected
in theory represents a composite of local economic conditions, federal rules
applicable to taxpayers in those conditions, and federal officials' effort at
ensuring compliance with the rules. By controlling for economic
conditions, I should be able to abstract away from the fine-grained and
often-unobservable variations in federal rules and effort and measure their
intermediate result, federal revenue collected.206
Relying on federal revenues collected in each state creates some
difficulties. IRS statistics on state-by-state collections do not fit perfectly
with what in theory I want to test. The IRS collects the locus of the legal
incidence of each tax, while the economic incidence may fall elsewhere.207
Still, to the extent that taxpayers' political responses are motivated in
significant part by the legal incidence of a tax,208 the legal incidence may be
an important determinant of crowding. In addition, to capture the possible
in-state economic incidence of taxes imposed in neighboring states, I
include population-weighted mean per capita tax burdens in geographically
adjacent states.209
As I also mentioned in Part III, I want to rule out the possibility that
simultaneous changes in demand for public goods could be driving both
any given year, there is no practical way to fully distinguish the impact of nationwide federal revenues
from other potential influences, such as national economic conditions.
Because some state taxes are federally deductible, state tax levels can affect federal revenues, a
potential endogeneity problem. To the extent this is true, however, it should tend to produce a negative
relationship between state taxes and federal taxes: when states collect more money, federal collections
are reduced. If I observed a negative relationship between federal and state revenues, I would be unable
to rule out the possibility that it is caused by this fiscal relationship. Instead, as I describe momentarily,
I observe a positive relationship. That I am able to identify a positive relationship despite this negative
feedback loop suggests that the true positive relationship might be even stronger than the one I measure.
In a web appendix, I describe additional statistical steps I take to account for this feedback relationship.
Brian Galle, Web Extension for: The Effect of National Revenues on Sub-national Revenues: Evidence
from the U.S. (Apr. 25, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2210024. If anything, I find that crowd-in is even more pronounced than I
report here. Id. at 4.
206 Controlling for a variable essentially means that we approximate the impact of other variables,
holding the controls constant. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSls 12-13 (7th ed. 2012).
For instance, in this case we will simulate mathematically what the impact of varying in-state federal
revenues would be if every state experienced the exact same economic conditions.
207 IRS data on the state of origin for corporate taxes is based on the legal residence of the
corporation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2011 DATABOOK 14 tbl.5 Notes (2011), which bears no real
connection to its economic activities; my main results are robust to omitting federal corporate taxes
from all variables.
208 For a discussion of the laboratory evidence to that effect, see Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan
Baron, The Political Psychology ofRedistribution, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1745 (2005).
209 Results are robust to omitting population weights.
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federal and state tax setting. Again, this story is fairly implausible in the
period covered by the sample, given that health spending is the only major
area of overlap. I therefore control for joint changes in demand for
government by including Medicaid and non-Medicaid state health spending
in the regression.
In order to explain any observed crowding in or out, I also include a
set of explanatory variables relating to the theories set out earlier. To test
the impact of federal deductibility, I include the value of state and local tax
(SALT) deductions claimed by taxpayers at varying income levels.210 I
check for income effects using federal direct grants and federal spending
(less grants) in each state-year. I set out the results of those additional tests,
and analyze their implications for the usefulness of the deduction for state
and local taxes, in a separate paper.211
I additionally include a group of control variables that is mostly
standard in the literature. Following prior work, I control for state
population; population squared; fraction of population under 26 and over
64; state median income, GDP, and unemployment rate; and state ideology.
I measure economic conditions using population-weighted mean GDP per
capita in adjacent states, as well as year effects. In some specifications (not
reported), I also account for possible idiosyncratic state trends using unit-
specific year effects.2 12 To rule out the possibility that any observed crowd-
in results are the effect of an important federal matching grant for
Medicaid, I control for each state's match rate (FMAP) and the interaction
between match rate and state Medicaid expenditures.
Finally, it is unclear in theory whether we should expect state reactions
to outside influences to be immediate, to entail some delay, or both. Some
210 Galle & Klick, supra note 139, at 226-36, find that the impact of SALT deductions varies by
income level, with very-high-income taxpayers having a disproportionate impact on state spending.
Because the reported SALT data are net of any AMT effects, I should not need to separately account for
AMT. To be cautious, however, I include AMT in some regressions; my results are robust to inclusion
or exclusion of the number of AMT payers in each income class.
Endogeneity is also a potential problem for the SALT deduction regressors. As Metcalf notes,
shocks to state wealth could simultaneously affect an individual's state and federal tax liability.
Metcalf, supra note 20, at 578. The former would reduce (increase) state revenues, while the latter
could diminish (enhance) the value of the federal deduction. I therefore adapt Metcalf's method to
construct my own instruments for SALT value and use 2SLS to double-check the OLS results. First, I
divide the population into groupings, by "AGI," a tax law measure of income before itemized
deductions. Then, for each grouping, I calculate the national average likelihood of itemizing and the
marginal tax rate at the midpoint of each range. Following Metcalf s formula, I use these figures to
compute an average national "tax price" for each grouping: the amount of pennies that, on average, a
person in that group would save from a one-dollar tax deduction. Because these figures are computed
from national averages, individual state conditions have little effect on them. But, since tax price
determines the dollar value of a SALT deduction, they are strongly correlated with the value of SALT
deductions for each state and income group. Because the equation is exactly identified I do not test for
weak instruments.
211 Galle, supra note 202, at 152-54.
212 For the most part my results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of unit-specific year effects.
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prior literature includes "lags" of major variables-that is, they examine
whether past years' data affect a current year's dependent variable.213 I
therefore included lags of the economic and tax variables in each
regression, and then, if these lags had no statistically significant results,
reran the regression without them. Inclusion of lags did not change the sign
of the main regressors of interest and did not alter the coefficients much, so
the regressions reported here omit the lags.
B. Results and Analysis
The main results of the fixed-effects regressions are summarized in
Table 1, below. The reported coefficient can be read as the percentage
change in state own-source revenues resulting from a 1% increase in each
logged regressor, or from a one-unit change in others.214 Column 1
summarizes a regression using state revenues per capita as the dependent
variable, while column 2 reports the same regression using state revenues
as a fraction of state GDP.
1024
213 See, e.g., Andersson et al., supra note 18, at 253, 255.
214 Although in some cases results were estimated more precisely in levels, I report results for
revenue and economic variables as log-log both for ease of interpretation and because of the skewness
of most per-state measures.
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TABLE 1: EFFECTS OF PER CAPITA FEDERAL TAX
COLLECTED IN STATE ON STATE REVENUES, 1998-2010
(1) (2)
Variables State Revs. State Revs.
per Capita per GDP
Log pc fed. revs. in state 0.355*** 0.355***
(6.089) (6.089)
Log fed. taxes pc in adj. states 0.00678 0.00678
(0.358) (0.358)
Log fed. non-grant expend in state pc 0.338*** 0.338***
(4.363) (4.363)
State unemployment -0.0231*** -0.0231***
(-3.456) (-3.456)
State median income in 2005 dollars 3.77e-06* 3.77e-06*
(1.860) (1.860)
FMAP -0.0139*** -0.0139***
(-2.892) (-2.892)
R-squared 0.928 0.946
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with year effects; regression includes state health
spending, logged federal grants, population under 26, and population over 64
(insignificant coefficients), and population, population square, logged values of state GDP
per capita, weighted adjacent-state GDP, and per capita SALT deductions by AGI
category (significant in some specifications); robust standard errors clustered by state;
coefficient reported with (t score); all dollar figures reported in 2005 dollars; N= 575;
*: statistically significant at a 5% level; **: statistically significant at a 1% level;
***: statistically significant at a 0.1% level.
In both of these regressions, as well as in a variety of other
specifications I employ as double checks, there is highly statistically
significant evidence that federal revenues crowd-in state revenues to a
considerable degree. For example, as Table 1 reports, I find a measured
elasticity of state revenue to federal revenues of 0.355. That is, when
federal revenues rise by 1%, holding constant annual economic effects and
local and regional economic factors, state revenues rise by 0.355%.
Regressions using in-state federal revenues collected as a fraction of state
GDP in place of per capita federal revenues collected in state similarly
produce an elasticity of about 0.34.215
215 Lags of federal revenues were insignificant in all these regressions, although in some cases
there was a modest positive coefficient for state-own source revenues, significant at the 10% level-
95% confidence intervals generally ran from -0.001 to 0.03. Consequently I report results from
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It is also worth noting that the control variables have impacts familiar
from the literature. For example, states with a larger school-age population
tend to raise more money. Likewise, state tax revenues increase with state
wealth and decrease with unemployment. State revenue per GDP declines
with GDP, likely because there is some delay in state adjustments to
changed circumstances, and because states smooth revenues to some
degree. Federal grants typically crowd-in state spending, and a more robust
neighboring economy boosts each state's revenues.
As additional robustness checks, I estimate each equation using logged
state expenditures per capita as the dependent variable, and separately
using first differences of the revenue variables. Results are qualitatively
similar to those reported.
An important caveat to my findings is that I am able to study only a
small segment of U.S. fiscal history. The theory I have sketched suggests
crowding may be sensitive to institutional design and voter behavior, both
of which can change over time. Still, the slice of time I have studied is the
slice closest to today, and spans an entire business cycle. If courts are
interested in how their decisions impact policy, these data are the most
relevant to Spending Clause decisions in the near future.
One other concern about the limited time span I study is that it
happens to have been a period of unusually low federal marginal income
tax rates. Nonetheless, federal revenues as a portion of GDP range from
their postwar high of 20.6% in 2000 to 15.1% in 2009 and 2010,
representing the lowest levels since 1950. Most years fall in the postwar
average range of 17% to 18%. The sample therefore arguably captures a
fairly representative set of federal taxing conditions.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that a key premise of the Supreme Court's recent
Medicaid decision rests on uncertain, perhaps even incorrect, facts. I do not
mean to say that my empirical findings can or should end the debate over
conditional spending. The proper roles of national and state governments in
our constitutional system will remain an enduring controversy."' At most
regressions in which lags are omitted. Including lags did not meaningfully change the coefficients
reported. Because arguably adjacent-state GDP could include the effect of lagged own-state tax rates, I
also include as robustness checks system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regressions in
which I instrument for lagged own-state revenues and neighbor GDP with prior years' values of those
variables. See Stephen R. Bond, Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and
Practice, I PORTUGUESE EcON. J. 141, 141-59 (2002) (explaining the need for and methodology of
implementing system-GMM). These regressions yield slightly greater elasticities, in the 0.6 range for
most specifications.
216 See sources cited supra note 63. For example, my own view is that even "coercive" regulation
could be justified in the situation in which federal regulation is needed to overcome collective action
problems among the states-indeed, when states have strong motives to defect from mutually beneficial
shared agreements, very potent federal tools are especially needed. Galle, supra note 38, at 185-91. But
1026
Does Federal Spending "Coerce" States?
my contribution here can help to move us past the overly reductive focus
on coercion and toward that larger debate, as well as providing a reminder
of the occasional importance of facts in public law.217
Canadian and Australian legal scholars can make similar use of my
findings. In both countries, there is a similar dispute over judicial control of
conditional federal spending.218 Those disputes, too, are often tangled in the
notion that grants coerce states.219 While cultural and institutional details of
course will differ, my work here suggests that similar empirical
investigation would help advance the discussion.
Finally, whatever their use for lawyers, my findings here should be of
independent interest to social scientists who study the fiscal relationship
between governments. Though the effects of federal revenue measures on
state finances have been a continuing topic of debate, the focus has until
now fallen on narrow, individual tax measures. My evidence helps to tilt
that discussion toward larger questions, such as whether a robust federal
government is consistent with a vibrant set of state enterprises. My hope is
that future work by myself and others will shed further light on which
institutional factors are central in preventing national efforts from crowding
out state rivals.
see Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 13, at 1951-54 (acknowledging this point, but arguing that
constitutional amendment is a viable alternative solution).
217 For a more in-depth discussion of the Court's questionable approach to fact-finding, see Brianne
J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 25-67
(2011).
218 See Hoi Kong, The Spending Power, Constitutional Interpretation and Legal Pragmatism,
34 QUEEN'S L.J. 305, 310-14 (2008); David W.S. Yudin, The Federal Spending Power in Canada,
Australia and the United States, 13 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 437, 451-53, 456-69 (2002).
219 See Jean-Frangois Gaudreault-DesBiens, The Irreducible Federal Necessity of Jurisdictional
Autonomy, and the Irreducibility of Federalism to Jurisdictional Autonomy, in DILEMMAS OF
SOLIDARITY: RETHINKING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE CANADIAN FEDERATION 185 (Sujit Choudhry et al.
eds., 2006); Yuden, supra note 218, at 454-55, 469-72.
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